VOL. 31 NO. 1 2005 without skin transplantation and biased ethical and judicial procedures that led to the approval of skin harvesting from Sydney. Since these deficiencies are likely to be systemic in nature and widely prevalent, in Part VI, I draw attention to the multiple pitfalls encountered in this treatment decision and offer some recommendations for hospital ethics committees faced with serious ethical treatment dilemmas. Finally, in Part VII, I offer some concluding remarks.
II. THE CASE OF JENNIFER AND SYDNEY''
On December 9, 2002, Jennifer Cowan was injured when her father's attempt to light the family fireplace resulted in an explosion. As a result, Jennifer suffered third-degree bums of over 80% of her body surface area-only her head, hands, and intertriginous areas were spared. Doctors estimated that Jennifer had a 30-50% chance of survival. Following a week of stabilizing treatment, including five days on a mechanical ventilator, Jennifer's treatment focused on re-establishing a protective barrier over her burned areas.^ Her surgeon removed her dead skin and covered exposed areas with whatever unburned skin could be harvested from unburned parts of Jennifer's body (i.e., autografts). Because Jennifer did not have enough unburned skin to cover all of her burned areas, additional human skin allografts were obtained using skin harvested from cadaveric skin donors. Doctors also used porcine xenografts (i.e., pigskin) to complete the job.^ Finally, a small piece of Jennifer's normal skin was removed (i.e., biopsied) and shipped to a laboratory to grow sheets of new skin.Ŝ hortly after her injury, Jennifer's surgeon learned that she was an identical twin. Upon learning this information, he entertained the notion that a skin graft from her identical twin, because of its identical genetic make-up, would give Jennifer her best chance of survival. Sensing that operating on Sydney for a skin graft donation would raise ethical and legal concerns, however, the surgeon requested review by the hospital ethics committee. The ethics committee interviewed Jennifer's family, her surgeon, and a consulting psychologist who had examined both Sydney and the parents. After discussion and deliberation, the committee offered the following recommendations: (1) the proposed skin grafting from Sydney to Jennifer represented a valid ethical option because Sydney would benefit from a continuing close personal relationship with Jennifer as identified by preliminary psychological evaluations; (2) follow-up psychological support should be provided to Sydney during and following the donation period; (3) Sydney's assent to the procedures was mandatory throughout the donation period; and (4) a court order to proceed with donation should be obtained before instituting isografting procedures.* On January 3, 2003, the girls' parents petitioned for a court order authorizing parental consent to the skin transplant operations and any associated procedures. ' The judge appointed a guardian ad litem ("GAL") for eaeh minor and set the matter for hearing three days later.'" At the hearing, the court accepted written reports from each GAL and took testimony from the parents, the surgeon, the consulting psychologist, and the hospital's medical director." The court also conducted a personal interview with the proposed donor, Sydney.'^ After noting specific objections voiced by Sydney's GAL, the court concluded that, in light of the facts and circumstances before it, the skin transplants were medically necessary and in the best interest of Jennifer.'^ In addition, the court held that the procedures posed negligible risks to Sydney as a donor and served her best interest.'"* Finally, the court stated that because the girls' parents were adequately informed of the physiological and psychological risks and benefits of the procedures, they therefore had the right to give informed consent to the operations.'T he probate court, however, failed to offer evidence, ethical principles, or legal precedent supporting its conclusions. Important evidence missing from the court's opinion included the surgeon's testimony estimating Jennifer's risk of mortality at 40-60% without skin grafts from Sydney and 10% with such grafts.'* The surgeon further testified that the risks accompanying Sydney's donor harvesting procedures were minimal." Moreover, while permanent discoloration of the skin at the harvested sites was inevitable and scarring was possible, the donor sites would include only the backs of the head, torso, and thighs, areas not ordinarily visible.'* The consulting psychologist acknowledged that Sydney faced substantial and unpredictable risks whether or not she served as a donor." If she were a donor, she would suffer physical side effects, including short-term acute pain and long-term skin discoloration and/or scarring. In addition, she would be at risk of long-term psychological injury, such as reduced self-esteem and feelings of isolation from being different, both of which could cause her to avoid intimate relationships. Sydney's self-esteem would increase if she served as a donor and her sister survived, whereas she could suffer severe emotional damage if she was not a donor and her sister died as a result. At the end of questioning, the psychologist acknowledged that identical twins generally form a greater bond than that found in routine sibling relationships.
Finally, the girls' parents unequivocally stated their preference for performance of the requested procedures.^° They were of the opinion that Sydney wanted to assist Jennifer if she could, and undergoing the proposed transplant procedures offered the best hope of keeping their family intact. Overall, the evidence for skin harvesting showed strong medical and parental support, Sydney's concomitant assent, and equivocal prediction on psychological benefits for Sydney. 
III. BIOETHICS AND SIBLING TRANSPLANTS
Clinical bioethical decision-making in a pediatric surgical case requires analysis of the decision in light of established ethical principles.^' Major ethical principles include respect for persons (i.e., autonomy), benefit to others (i.e., beneficence), harm avoidance (i.e., nonmaleficence), and fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of treatment (i.e., justice).^^ Jonsen et al. have proposed a widely accepted framework to examine ethical issues in clinical bioethics.^'' Their technique calls for case evaluation in each of four areas: (1) medical indications for treatment, including risks, benefits, and burdens; (2) patient preferences based on patient autonomy; (3) quality of life issues; and (4) contextual features, including socioeconomic, family, and legal issues.^'' This section examines each of these areas in light of Jennifer and Sydney.
A. MEDICAL INDICATIONS
A rational assessment to determine whether a proposed medical treatment is indicated depends on the natural history ofthe clinical condition and the spectrum of available treatments. Severe burns in children are usually managed at burn centers and result in prolonged hospitalization involving complex management.^' Hospitalizations can be divided into four phases based on treatment priorities: initial evaluation/resuscitation, initial wound excision and biological closure, definitive wound closure, and rehabilitation.^^ The initial resuscitative phase focuses on stabilization of vital organ function and identification ofthe nature and extent ofthe burns, as well as any associated injuries.^' This phase is characterized by typical interventions found in most intensive care units, such as establishment of artificial airways, mechanical ventilation, and massive fluid resuscitation to correct for fluid losses in injured tissue and the environment. Doctors define burns according to the depth, or severity, of the skin's injury. Bum severity ranges from first-degree superficial bums (e.g., sunbum) to severe third-and fourth-degree bums (i.e., fullthickness injury). First-and second-degree burns regenerate normal skin and are painful, whereas third-and fourth-degree bums do not regenerate normal skin and are not painful. Topical treatment with antiseptic agents helps to prevent secondary infection of bumed areas. The resuscitation phase of treatment is usually completed in the first twenty-four to seventy-two hours.
For extensive bums (i.e., greater than 50% body surface area) the second phase-initial excision and biological closure of the bumed areas-is crucial to long-term survival.^* In this phase, doctors attempt to surgically remove the bulk of the full-thickness bumed skin and cover the bum wound (i.e., underlying region) with a suitable biological dressing before the bum wound colonizes or becomes infected by microbes. Occurrence of burn wound infection is a serious event that complicates treatment. Besides causing sloughing of biological coverings, bum wound infections allow microbial invasion into deeper tissues and the bloodstream, significantly increasing mortality. Successful excision and biological closure reduce infectious risk. The timing of excision and closure varies among surgeons, but the procedure usually begins, at the latest, by the end ofthe first week post-bum.
From a clinical standpoint, skin consists of two functional anatomic parts-the dermis and epidermis. The dermis, the innermost layer of skin, provides strength and flexibility, whereas the epidermis, the top layer of skin, serves as a vapor and bacterial barrier.^' The epidermis continually regenerates itself from basal cells that reside next to the dermis.^" A skin replacement covering can be fully classified by three different features: whether it is temporary or permanent; whether it substitutes for epidermis, dermis, or both; and whether it comes from a biologic or synthetic source.^' Temporary coverings provide physiologic characteristics of skin, but possess only a finite life span of three to four weeks before requiring replacement. Temporary coverings currently include porcine xenografts, synthetic nylon membranes with a silastic outer layer, and allografts from tissue or organ donors. Atlografts represent the standard by which all temporary coverings are measured.^T he gold standard for permanently covering full-thickness burns is the use of split-thickness autografts.^' In lieu of autograft material, other permanent coverings include cultured epithelial cells and synthetic dermal coverings.^'' Epithelial transplants used alone to cover full-thickness wounds have a 50-70% success rate and less durability than autografts.^' Synthetic dermal coverings promote growth of dermal structure and allow for later coverage with ultra-thin autografts.
From the facts and background information of Jennifer and Sydney's case, one may propose the likely course of hospital events leading up to the twins' court hearing. At the end of Jennifer's resuscitative phase, sometime between December 10th and December 12th, Jennifer's surgeon petitioned the hospital ethics committee to consider the appropriateness of harvesting skin from Sydney. He did so at this time because his attention turned to the excision and initial closure phase of treatment. Autografts were the covering of choice for third-degree bums, but Jennifer did not have enough viable skin remaining to cover her wounds. Isografts from Sydney, however, would be virtually identical to autografts from Jennifer, and using both would cover the bulk of Jennifer's burn wounds. Furthermore, this approach would entail the shortest recovery time and offer Jennifer the best potential long-term cosmetic result. The time interval for ethics committee review, coupled with the need to seek court approval, was too long in light of the pressing need for wound closure. Thus, the surgeon excised and initially closed Jennifer's bum wounds using allografts and porcine xenografts. The initial closure was probably completed between December 17th and December 20th. Moreover, the skin biopsy to culture skin epithelial cells may have been performed shortly after resuscitation was completed, between December 10th and December 12th. Although isografts were unavailable for initial closure, there would be another opportunity for their use when the time came for permanent closure of Jennifer's wounds. The temporary coverings would begin to slough after three or four weeks, just around the time the parents' petition was filed. Thus, Jennifer survived the initial wound closure without documented complications-a crucial step to prolonged survival. At the hearing, Jennifer's surgeon testified that Jennifer had a 40-60% chance of survival without isografting. Her mortality risk would decrease to 10% with successful isografting.^^ As many as two or three harvesting procedures could be necessary to adequately cover the burn wound, with an expected engraftment rate of 90% (i.e., percentage of graft successfully functioning). The parents' attomey also informed the court that sheets of cultured epithelial cells for grafting were scheduled to arrive on January 9th-three days after the hearing date.^^ Information not before the court, but easily obtained from a computerized medical literature search, showed that the statistical mortality rate at other bum centers for burns similar to Jennifer's was nearly 20%. Further, cultured epithelial cell grafts had an engraftment rate of 50-70%, and they had somewhat less satisfactory long-term cosmetic and functional results compared to autografts.''* From an ethical viewpoint, assessment of the benefits, risks, and burdens of the surgical treatments yield different results for each girl. In Jennifer's situation, skin grafting had a definite benefit because it would reduce her risk of death and morbidity from her burn wounds. The reduced risk of death and morbidity outweighed the risk of harm associated with undergoing multiple staged grafting procedures. Moreover, the burdens Jennifer suffered as a result of the grafting procedures were justified in light of the physical and psychological benefits she gained from the procedures. Finally, Jennifer realized additional physiological benefits by using isografts harvested from Sydney, as such grafts were tantamount to using Jennifer's own skin. Of course, Jennifer had to undergo grafting procedures to iiTiplant a permanent covering anyway, but isografting greatly reduced the number of procedures that Jennifer needed.
In contrast, Sydney did not realize physiological benefits from skin harvesting. Any potential benefits for her would be psychological, but unpredictable. Sydney's risk of life-threatening complications from the skin harvesting procedures was extremely low. Sydney likely experienced, however, a few days of moderate acute pain, which required analgesics, and some disfigurement over the areas harvested. In these types of procedures, some psychological harm from the acute pain following the procedures is almost certain. But, the extent of additional harm from the potential emotional disturbance and social stigmatization associated with permanent cosmetic changes is unpredictable. Moreover, the justification for skin harvesting in Sydney was uncertain. With no clear physiologic benefit, was it fair for Sydney to undergo the burden of skin harvesting when she had no role in Jennifer's injury? Looking forward, justification depends on whether the unpredictable psychological benefits gained by Sydney are proportionate to the burdens from the harvesting procedures. Although Jennifer clearly benefited from the skin grafting procedures, Sydney's benefits are hard to define.
From a purely medical standpoint, more information conceming Jennifer's treatment options was needed before decisions involving Sydney were made. What Formulation of and answers to such questions require objective medical information.
Although hospital ethics committees generally have physician representation, there is no guarantee, nor is it likely, that expertise in burn treatment will be present. Certainly, there was no indication that such questions were asked and answered in this case. In fact, while Sydney's GAL documented an interview with the division chief of pediatric surgery at the hospital, the GAL report only included statements regarding the effects of the harvesting procedures on Sydney.
Questions arise from an ethical perspective as well. Should the risk of mortality be imminent before harvesting a donor's skin for grafting? Is risk of mortality the only relevant factor? Should Sydney have undergone harvesting if the major benefits to Jennifer were only to improve the long-term appearance and function of her skin? How much weight should be accorded speculative psychological benefits as compared to the definite side effects and permanent physical residua of the surgical harvesting procedures? With so many uncertainties, in the final analysis it seems that the principle of autonomy warrants taking the prudent view, namely, that the harvesting procedures should have been permitted, if at all, only to save the life of Jennifer. From a pragmatic view, this approach would appear to provide Sydney with the best protection against potential unethical medical intervention.
B. PATIENT PREFERENCES
The importance granted to patient preferences in decision-making is grounded in the principle of autonomy (i.e., respect for persons). This principle forms the ethical foundation for the process of informed consent.'" Because minors cannot make autonomous decisions, skin transplantation between minors generates difficult questions regarding who should decide treatment and what treatment should be chosen. This subsection addresses the question of who should make medical decisions for minors in Sydney's position; what treatment to chose is discussed in the following subsection on quality of life.
From a legal standpoint, minors such as Jennifer and Sydney lack the necessary competence to make informed medical decisions. As such, the doctrine of informed Recently, a modified two-step approach to informed consent for medical treatment has been proposed. First, minors must assent to the proposed medical treatment.'" Assent of the minor requires both an explanation of the proposed medical treatment in a manner consistent with the minor's decisional capacity and the solicitation of the minor's willingness to accept the proposed care.'*^ In certain situations, a refusal of assent may be ethically binding, such as in research trials or where the proposed intervention is not essential to the welfare of the child or may be deferred without substantial risk. Certainly, Sydney's assent should have been ethically mandatory in order to proceed with harvesting her skin, and the ethics committee appropriately recommended this. But what about Jennifer? Case documentation does not indicate that the parents or doctors addressed whether Jennifer should have assented to receive Sydney's skin grafts. At first glance, it is clear that Jennifer would benefit from the skin grafts. Solely focusing on the physical benefits of the skin grafting procedures, however, diverts attention from a deeper issue, namely, whether Jennifer would suffer adverse psychological effects"â s a result of the skin grafts. Analysis of such psychological effects may be just as important as analyzing the physical benefits of a given medical procedure. In any event, there is no evidence that potential psychological effects were acknowledged in the acquisition of Jennifer's assent. Second, parents must give informed permission to the proposed medical treatment.'"' Informed parental permission includes all of the elements of informed consent for parental deliberation.''^ In circumstances where medical treatment provides a clear benefit to the child, informed parental permission will outweigh the child's refusal to assent to the proposed treatment. This would likely have been the case here had Jennifer refused assent to receive Sydney's skin grafts.
After one recognizes the girls' incompetence to make treatment decisions, further examination leads one to conclude that their parents were similarly incompetent. Several factors contribute to this conclusion.''* First, the psychologist conveyed to Sydney's GAL that the girls' father exhibited profound guilt for causing the accident that led to Jennifer's bums."^ Second, the girls' mother suffered from obsessive/compulsive disorder and harbored severe anger toward the father."* Together, both parents were extremely eager to see Jennifer undergo the procedures, as they offered the hope of reducing Jennifer's risk of death and hastening her recovery. In light of such factors, it is hard to imagine the parental decision to harvest Sydney's skin was truly voluntary. In their book on surrogate decision- Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 315 (1995) .
'^ W. at 315-16.
The constant reminder of Sydney's sacrifice and the accompanying feelings of indebtedness would bring on these psychological effects.
•" See American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), supra note 41, at 316-17.
See In re Sidney Cowan, No. 180564, Guardian Ad Litem Report to the Court, at 3. "
Id. ' ' Id. making, Buchannan and Brock lend credence to the conclusion that the twins' parents were incompetent to consent to harvesting.'*' The authors point to three types of circumstances that ought to disqualify the family from the role of surrogate decision maker.^" These include: circumstances that identify specific conditions leading to disqualification, such as if there is a serious conflict of interest likely to hias a family's decision; circumstances that deserve special scrutiny, such as when a minor falls into an especially vulnerable category (e.g., if the family seeks removal of a minor's organs for transplantation); and circumstances under which the decision is unreasonable based on the soundness of the proposed medical treatment alternatives.^' Clearly, the twins' parents fall into the first two categories, if not all three.
In instances where both children and parents are incompetent to consent to medical treatment, institutional ethics committees may serve a valuable role in identifying ethically appropriate treatment regimens. Because ethics committees uniformly lack authority to make medical decisions, an ethics committee's recommendation would be binding only if the health care providers and parents had privately agreed to abide by it before proceeding with medical treatment. The lack of ethics committee authority exposes health care providers and parents to legal claims of battery, lack of informed consent, child abuse, and neglect." Potential liability for such claims usually will lead one or more parties to seek judicial approval to proceed with medical treatment.'^ Here, the ethics committee recommended specific court approval of the harvesting procedures even though it determined that the harvesting procedures were ethically valid.'" Presumably, the committee felt that the parents were unable to give informed consent to the procedures, although this was not mentioned.
C. QUALITY OF LIFE
In the context of a case like Jennifer and Sydney's, deciding whether to perform a medical procedure will depend on the ability of the involved parties to determine what is in each child's best interest. This is essentially a quality of life analysis.^' The previous subsection on medical indications alluded to the fact that the impairment of each twin's quality of life would have differed depending on whether or not surgeons performed the harvesting procedures. Obviously, Jennifer's extensive bums and severe scarring profoundly diminished her quality of life. Her qualify of life likely improved following the skin grafting procedures and a shortterm convalescence. The greatest quality of life improvement for Jennifer, however, was the reduction in her risk of mortality. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 39, at 102. Any one of several different standards may apply in a case of incompetent patients; the standards are advanced directives, substituted judgment, and the patient's best interest. Advanced directives and substituted judgment standards are based upon prior autonomous preferences of a currently incompetent patient. Thus, they are considered subjective standards. For patients who have neither reached competeney nor will never attain it, the best interest standard is most appropriate.
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Sydney's quality of life was also affected by the decision to serve as a skin donor. Her quality of life could have been affected in three ways. First, it would have been most harmed if she underwent harvesting and Jennifer subsequently died. Second, it would have been most improved if Jennifer could have survived without the need for Sydney to serve as a skin donor. Finally, it would be somewhere in between if she served as a donor and Jennifer survived. Certainly, the resulting cosmetic changes from skin harvesting, even if in typically unexposed areas and not impairing her physiologic function, would have the tangible effect of "branding" her for life. Yet, weighing the psychological harms and benefits with the physical harms of harvesting is difficult because of the uncertainties associated with the psychological components. In their book on medical ethics, Beauchamp and Childress acknowledge this very problem in the following manner:
Unfortunately the best interest standard has sometimes been interpreted as highly malleable, thereby permitting values that are irrelevant to the patient's benefits or burdens. For example, when parents have sought court permission for a kidney transplant from an incompetent minor child to a sibling, parental judgments about the "donor's" best interest have, on occasion, taken into account projected psychological trauma from the death of the sibling and the psychological benefits of the unselfish act of "donation." While we would not exclude such considerations altogether, we should greet them with skepticism and additional procedural protections, such as committee review.'* In this case, the ethics committee based its support for skin harvesting in large part on a balancing of projected psychological factors. One wonders whether the committee's conclusion of a net psychological benefit from the harvesting procedures was due to better knowledge and understanding of the situation, or to the same malleable standard referred to by Beauchamp and Childress.
To this point, the bioethical analysis of medical indications, patient preferences, and quality of life has yet to yield an answer to the question of whether harvesting should have been performed on Sydney. This comes from the indefiniteness associated with equivocal predictions about the nature and degree of the potential psychological effects. Application of a malleable best interest standard by ethics committees and courts allows for the weighing of other more or less relevant factors from contextual circumstances to draw a fmal conclusion. Such contextual features may be outcome determinative unless a more rigid structure is developed for the best interest standard itself At this point, the bioethical principles presented in this section yield no clear result.
D. CONTEXTUAL FEATURES
This case presents a number of fascinating features that illustrate how the health care and legal systems respond to complex ethical situations. The Birmingham News article began by quoting Sydney on the morning of the harvesting procedures as saying to her mother, "Today I am going to do the greatest thing of my life."" The events leading up to the harvesting procedures were relatively straightforward. The surgeon felt obliged to inform the family of all possible treatment alternatives in the Id at 103. See Parks, supra note 2. informed consent discussion of Jennifer's bum treatment, and he advised that the twin skin transplantation had the best rislc/benefit ratio. The parents wanted this option exercised and remained steadfast in this decision. The surgeon remained committed as well.
After the hospital administration was informed of the proposed harvesting, the hospital medical director obtained a "curbside" consultation from a pediatric ethicist in Ohio, who opined that performance of the harvesting in Sydney would be tantamount to child abuse. Thus, the hospital administration's initial information cautioned against going forward with the harvesting procedures. Meanwhile, the surgeon was seeking his own advice on the matter from a long-term acquaintance and judge in Louisiana, whose opinion was that, with Jennifer's life at risk, no court would hold against the parents' wishes and the physician's recommendation for the harvesting procedures. The surgeon also consulted with an outside surgeon, who both confirmed the feasibility of the harvesting procedures and admonished that the survival rate of patients with burns similar to Jennifer's was 10% at his institution. The girls' surgeon discounted this statistic as too optimistic.
Obviously, one can see that the hospital and surgeon possessed initially opposite viewpoints of what ought to be done. Once the hospital ethics committee found harvesting ethically acceptable, the hospital, through its attorneys, requested a meeting with the family, surgeon, and hospital administration to discuss a variety of issues. At the meeting, the parents expressed significant knowledge and understanding of the alternate treatments for Jennifer in general and the harvesting procedures in particular. A potential transfer of Jennifer to another institution arose, but the parents quickly dismissed this possible option. The meeting ended with Jennifer remaining at the hospital under the care of her same surgeon. Jennifer's surgeon left with the impression that the main purpose of the meeting was to effectuate a transfer of the patient; he remained suspicious of the hospital's motives for the requested meeting.
Before the parents retained counsel prior to the judicial hearing, the hospital's lawyers were the only legal representation involved. After the ethics committee's recommendation, the hospital's attorneys proposed seeking judicial determination in juvenile court, but later reported that "feedback" for petitioning in juvenile court would not be greeted enthusiastically by the judiciary. As much of the case law applicable here derived from probate or circuit court decisions, a recommendation to petition the juvenile court to hear this case seemed misplaced. Perhaps the extensive confidentiality protections afforded by a juvenile proceeding influenced the recommendation, or maybe the concept of child abuse and neglect had not been fully put to rest. Either way, the hospital's legal approach frustrated the surgeon, prompting him to recommend to the parents that they retain their own counsel. Again, the surgeon felt that the hospital was more concerned with the potential longterm liability from performance of the procedures than with the pressing needs of a severely burned child. The surgeon never realized that the hospital might have considered vetoing the harvesting procedures despite the ethics committee's approval. In the end, the parents filed their petition in probate court for authorization to consent to the harvesting procedures, and the hospital, although represented at the hearing by counsel, did not intervene.
Another important contextual point centers on the role of parents and their rights to direct family matters. The parents' commitment to the harvesting procedures was substantial and firm, with the expressed intention to benefit Jennifer. Certainly, the potential loss of a family member presents a unique familial situation, and members
of the family unit are most likely to respond when a member is in need. The Supreme Court has summarized the legal presumption toward the rights of the family in the following way:
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course and asserted that parents generally have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare their children for additional obligations. Surely, this includes a "high duty" to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice. The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that the natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. As with so many other legal presumptions, experience and reality may rebut what the law accepts as a starting point. . . That some parents may at times be acting against the interests of their children . . . creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human experience the teaches us that parents generally do act in the child's best interests.^* Thus, the twins' parents may have been incompetent to make a decision to harvest skin from Sydney, but may have still been competent to represent what was best for the family unit. From a utilitarian view, a parental decision to harvest skin from Sydney may serve to maximize the greatest good of the family unit, even if such a decision is unethical to Sydney individually.
IV. JUDICIAL OPINIONS
Few published cases involve organ transplantation between minor siblings, and fewer yet between minor identical twins.^' The case oi Hart v. Brown, the closest on point, addresses kidney transplantation from a healthy seven-year-old to her twin sibling suffering from chronic renal failure following hemolytic-uremic syndrome.^" Because she experienced hypertensive complications, the ill twin underwent bilateral nephrectomies, leaving her no hope to recover kidney function. In an action for declaratory judgment, the parents asked the court to grant them authority to consent to kidney transplantation.*' The court held that "natural parents of a minor should have the right to give their consent to an isograft kidney transplantation procedure when their motivation and reasoning are favorably reviewed by community representation which includes a court of equity."^^ In reaching its holding, the court cited the following factors as of paramount importance: the procedure was necessary to save the life of the one twin; the risks of operation to both twins were negligible; transplant from a parent would be substantially more burdensome for the ill twin '* Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979 because life-long immunosuppressive treatment would be required; the prognosis for good health and long life was excellent if the operations were performed; and the parents' motivation and reasoning were favorably reviewed by the children's GALs and physicians, local clergy, and the court.*^ The court also considered the psychological benefits to the donor-somewhat discounted by the court because of the child's age-and assent of the donor.^"* To buttress its holding, the court cited several sources of authority. Regarding its authority to act in the case, the court cited Strunk v. Strunk,^^ in which the court authorized parental consent under the theory of substituted judgment, and several unreported cases from Massachusetts involving kidney transplants between minor siblings, in which each court acted upon the inherent power of a court of equity.** In addition, the court cited Bonner v. Moran" as authority for the premise that nontherapeutic operations are legally permissible on a minor as long as the parents or other guardians consent to the procedure.** The court acknowledged the need to balance the parents' right to consent with the right of the incompetent donor child, and ultimately held that justice required granting the parents the right to consent to the kidney transplant.*' In the court's opinion, parental interest with proper motivation and reasoning outweighed any contrary interest of the minor donor.™ Examination of the cases cited in Hart is instructive. In Strunk, a Kentucky appellate court considered the right of a natural mother, as guardian of her incompetent, mentally retarded adult son, to consent to transplant of one of his kidneys to his adult brother.^' The incompetent son resided at a state mental hospital and had an intelligence level of a six-year-old.^^ Both his family and the mental health department approved of the kidney donation." The county and circuit courts agreed, reasoning that the transplant served the incompetent's best interest, as the psychological and emotional harms resulting from the loss of his brother outweighed the physical trauma of an operation.'"* On appeal, the GAL questioned whether the " Id. See Melvin Lewis, Kidney Donation by a 7-year-old Identicai Twin Chiid, 13 J. AM. ACAD. ADOL. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 221 £1974). This paper gives an account of the psychiatrist who evaluated the twins in the Hart case. He particularly points out the psychological effects on the family one to two years after the transplant. He noted that the donor twin had recurrent dreams involving loss of a body part. Also the psychiatrist had the chance to see the healthy twin again some 14 years later when she was a young adult. Some of the long-term psychological effects he discovered were that throughout adolescence she became overprotective of her previously ill sibling because of concern about physical injury to her donated kidney. Later she moved to Europe at age 18 without her sister and she never seemed able to form close intimate relationships with others. court had the power to authorize the removal of an organ from an incompetent.'' The appellate court concluded that a court of equity had such power as part of its inherent powers, and stated that the previous equity doctrine of substituted judgment formed the basis of its power in this instance.'* In referring to the substituted judgment doctrine, the court stated, "The right to act for the incompetent in all cases has become recognized in this country as the doctrine of substituted judgment and is broad enough not only to cover property but also to cover all matters touching on the well-being of the ward."" Here, the Strunk court did not use the term "substituted judgment" as a standard for decision-making, but, rather, as a general term referring to the power of a court of equity to make a proxy decision for an incompetent. In citing Bonner, the Hart court invoked the notion of negative implication to espouse the principle that non-therapeutic operations can be legally permitted on a minor as long as the parents or other guardians consent to the procedure.'* In Bonner, a surgeon was sued for assault and battery following a skin grafting procedure from a fifteen-year-old minor to his severely burned cousin.™ The operation was performed without the consent of the minor's mother.*" The district court charged the jury that the surgeon would not be liable for battery if the boy was capable of appreciating, and did appreciate, the nature and consequence of the operation, and thereafter consented to the operation.*' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, holding that the mother's consent was necessary to avoid a claim of battery.*^ Because the skin grafting procedure had already occurred, however, the court never addressed whether it had the power to authorize such an operation. As such, Bonner is generally regarded to hold only that a surgeon must obtain parental consent to operate on a minor to preserve an affirmative defense to a claim of battery brought by the minor's parents.*^ Bonner does not explicitly endorse a parent's right to consent to non-therapeutic procedures in minors.*"* In addition to Strunk and Bonner, the Hart court relied heavily on three unreported cases decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts on emergency appeal.*^ The three cases involved kidney transplants in identical twins aged nineteen, fourteen, and fourteen. Each donor consented to the transplant.** In all three instances, the court authorized transplantation, concluding that the potential emotional detriment suffered by the healthy twin in response to the imminent death of the twin sibling, as detailed by expert psychiatric testimony, outweighed the (Mass, Sup, Jud, Ct, 1957); Foster v, Harrison, No, 68674 Eq, (Mass, Sup, Jud, Ct, 1957) , For a detailed summary of these eases, see generally Curran, supra note 66, " See Curran, supra note 66, at 892-94, potential physical detriment of kidney donation to the donor.^' These Massachusetts cases, by finding direct benefit to the donors, implicitly invoked parens patriae^^ as the jurisdictional basis to authorize transplant procedures between identical twin minors. Following these three cases, genuine concern has been raised regarding the capacity of court proceedings to adequately safeguard the interests of the minor donor.*' In contrast to the legal standard adopted in Hart, the courts in Strunk and the Massachusetts cases adopted a legal standard based on the best interest of the donor. Under this standard, the psychological benefits to the donor were weighed against the risk of physical harm from the transplant procedures using a "preponderance of the evidence" evidentiary standard.'" This is in contrast to Hart, where the court deferred to parental decision-making provided that such a decision did not offend community mores or the court. Subsequent judicial opinions in this area, as discussed below, have expressly favored the best interest standard; yet, the primacy of parental rights expressed in Hart appears to have important, albeit unstated, influence."
Since Hart, several other courts have considered the topic of organ donation by a healthy incompetent sibling. In Little v. Little^^ a Texas appellate court affirmed a probate court order authorizing a kidney transplant from a fourteen-year-old female with Down's syndrome to her brother.'^ The brother, suffering from end-stage renal disease, and the mother, as guardian, petitioned the probate court for authorization to consent to kidney donation.'" After approval of the petition, the donor's GAL appealed, arguing that the court lacked the power to authorize consent.'^ The appellate court rejected the GAL's argument and turned to the doctrine of substituted judgment.'* This doctrine, as construed by the Texas Supreme Court, requires a court to substitute itself as nearly as possible for the incompetent and act with the same motives and reasoning.'^ Turning to the evidence, the court concluded that there was a close and caring relationship between the siblings and sufficient medical testimony to presume that the incompetent would receive substantial psychological benefit from serving as a transplant donor.'* Furthermore, the court determined that the incompetent seemed willing to go forward with the procedure without undue family pressure, that there was parental consent, that the brother would probably "
Even though identical twins were involved, only one of the three transplants achieved twoyear survival. Id. at 898. " Parens patriae is "the principle that the state must care for those that cannot care for themselves." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990). The words literally translated mean "parent of the country." Id.
* benefit substantially from transplant, and that the dangers of the operation were minimal.^' Finally, the court found that transplant was the only reasonable alternative without which the brother would suffer severe and progressive deterioration.""' While the court ultimately affirmed the probate court's authorization of the kidney transplant, it complimented the vigorous adversarial role played by the GAL in defending the donor's due process rights.
In contrast to Little, several courts have denied petitions for transplants between close family members, including siblings. In McFall v. Shrimp, "" an adult dying of aplastic anemia sought a court order to mandate bone marrow donation by his adult first cousin, who had previously refused to undergo the procedure.'"^ The court rejected the petition, finding that the right to individual autonomy precluded the government from ordering an invasion of one's body for the benefit of another without proper consent.'°Î n In re Guardianship of Pescinski,^"'^ the guardian of an incompetent adult with schizophrenia petitioned a Wisconsin county court for permission to consent to kidney donation by the incompetent to his sister, who was suffering from chronic renal failure.'"^ Other siblings either were incompatible donors or had refused donation for personal reasons.'"* The incompetent's GAL, however, objected to the proposed donation on the ground that the incompetent would receive no benefit from the procedure.'"^ Even in light of psychiatric testimony that described the incompetent as catatonic with little interaction with his environment or persons in general, the Wisconsin county court denied the petition.'"* On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed, expressly rejecting the substituted judgment doctrine adopted in Strunk.^^'^ Specifically, the court found that in the absence of statutory authority granting it such power, the incompetent needed to consent to the procedure or receive an established benefit from the procedure for the court to have authority to grant the petition for the transplant operation."" In dissent, one justice argued that the court did have jurisdiction based on its power in equity, and proposed a multi-factor test for determining whether a court should issue an approval of consent.'" These factors included the following: a strong showing that the recipient will suffer death without the transplant; all other reasonable steps to find another donor have been utilized; the proposed donor is closely related to the proposed donee; the incompetent would probably consent if he or she were Wis. 1981) , the Supreme Court of Wisconsin revisited its holding in Peseinski related to jurisdiction. The court disavowed an interpretation of that holding that the courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter beeause the state eonstitutioti granted plenary jurisdiction to the eircuit eourt. Rather, as in Eberhardy, the eourt viewed the holding in Pescinski as "an exercise of judicial restraint under particular circumstances. Those circumstances included lack of consent of the GAL, no showing of benefit to the ward, and absence of legislative guidanee." Id. at 893 n.l3.
'" See In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d at 182-83 (Day, J., dissenting).
competent; the proposed donor is in good health; and the operation presents minimal risk, such that the donor could function normally following it."Î n In re Richardson,'^^ a Louisiana court rejected a proposed kidney donation from a seventeen-year-old mentally retarded boy to his adult sister, who was suffering from end-stage renal disease.""* Specifically, the court found that a transplant was not immediately necessary to save the sister's life and that the proposed benefit to the boy, namely, that the sister, if transplanted, would be in position to care for him following the parents' death, was too speculative."M oreover, because Louisiana law affords unqualified protection against intrusion into a minor's property rights, the court found it inconceivable to afford less protection to a minor's right to be free of bodily intrusion unless it was in the minor's best interest."* In the case o{ Curran v. Bosze, "' the Illinois Supreme Court addressed whether minor twins should serve as bone marrow donors for their twelve-year-old halfbrother, who was dying of leukemia."* As the twins were illegitimate progeny of the father, the mother brought a paternity action against the father after their birth."' The mother was granted sole care, custody, control, and educational responsibility of the twins.'•^'^ Of particular importance was a provision in the paternity order that stated, "In matters of importance relating to the health, education, and welfare of the children. Mother shall consult and confer with the Father, with a view toward adopting and following a harmonious policy."'^' The father requested the mother's consent to screening and, if screening showed compatibility, to harvesting of a twin's bone marrow for transplant to the twelve-year-old.'^'^ After gathering information on the procedure and subsequent deliberation, the mother refused.'" The father sought emergency relief in circuit court, but was denied after an initial hearing and again on remand from appeal.'^'' The father appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
Upon review, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed its jurisdictional authority and announced a legal standard for deciding cases concerning bone marrow donation by minors. With regard to the former, the court was persuaded by the jurisdictional arguments presented in Strunk and Hart, and, thus, implicitly based its power to Id. at 183. In fact, Sydney's GAL proposed these standards to the Cowan court, but never argued that Jennifer was already one month out from injury without exhibiting any life-threatening complications, that she had been grafted with alternative sources several times, or that the cultured epithelial cells were ready for transplantation. Concluding that the benefits of harvesting outweighed the risks, the court found that skin harvesting was in Sydney's best interest.
"^ /« re Richardson, 284 So.2d 185 (La. App. 1973). "'' Mat 187. "= Id "' Id '" Curranv. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319(1990) . "* W. at 1321. "" Id at 1320. '2" Id '^' Id. (internal quotations omitted). '^ Id. at 1321. The author realizes that the risk of bone marrow harvesting differs from skin harvesting. In general, the risks of bone marrow harvesting include only the risks of the procedure itself and the associated anesthesia without long-term physical sequelae such as noticeable scarring. Like skin and unlike the kidney, bone marrow is a regenerating organ and removal of a portion of it does not leave an anatomical or functional deficit. Fewer risks are associated with bone marrow harvesting than other transplant procedures. decide the case on the inherent powers of a court of equity.'^^ In regard to the latter, the court specifically rejected the application of the substituted judgment standard.'^* While it had previously applied the standard to analyze decision-making by guardians of incompetents, the court held that the substituted judgment standard was not applicable when decision-making was required for a minor or a person who has never been competent.'^^ The substituted judgment standard demanded that the surrogate's decision follow the expressed wishes of the incompetent or arise from the personal values of the incompetent during a period of competency.'^* Because minors have not yet reached the age of competence, a surrogate decision has no basis in the minor's mature intent and, thus, cannot represent a substituted judgment.'^' As such, the court held that a parent or guardian may consent on behalf of a minor for bone marrow donation only when it would be in the minor's best interest.'^" The court went further and identified three critical factors that are necessary to meet the best interest determination. First, the parent or guardian must give informed consent to the bone marrow procedure.''" Second, the child's caretaker(s) must be available to provide the child with emotional support.'^^ Third, there must be an existing, close relationship between a donor and the recipient, for as the court reasoned, there was no physical benefit to a child serving as a donor.'^^ Rather, the only benefit, if any, was psychological, which could be firmly grounded only if the proposed recipient and donor knew each other as family members at the time of the contemplated transplant.'^'' After having established the framework within which a best interest determination would be made, the court denied the petition for transplant for failing the three-factor test. First, the court found that the procedure lacked the necessary informed consent, as the twins' mother understood the risks and benefits of the procedure and refused to consent based on the infrequent, but significant, complications from the procedure.'^^ Second, the court determined that the requisite emotional support was lacking, for the mother, as primary caretaker, was unable to provide the necessary support given her opposition to the harvesting procedure.'^F inally, the court found a close relationship lacking.''" Specifically, the court held that although the twins had met the proposed recipient on previous occasions, they did not know he was their brother.'^* Because all three necessary factors were absent, the court denied the father's petition.
Further analysis reveals that the three critical factors discussed in Curran strongly favor parental decision-making authority for bone marrow donation in children. The first two factors require the parent or guardian to consent to the procedure and provide an emotionally supportive environment for the donor child. While not expressly dependent upon parental decision-making, the third factor necessitates indirect parental decision-making. In Curran, for instance, at their mother's request, the twins were not previously told about their half-brother. Of course, the mother had no direct relationship with the twelve-year-old and, unlike the father, could make a detached decision for the twins. An interesting and difficult question would have arisen, however, had the mother objected to a transplant needed by the father instead of the half-brother. In this instance, while saving the life of the father would clearly serve the twins' best interest, the twin donors' primary caretakers would be unavailable to provide the required emotional support. As such, the court would be forced to rethink the necessity of the three-factor framework.
In light of the shortcomings of the cases discussed herein, the following principle is proposed. To successfully petition for authorization of an organ donation by a minor to a sibling, the petitioner must satisfy two requirements, namely, the donation must be in the best interest of the child donor and the donor's parents or guardian must give informed consent to the transplant. Regarding the former, one could show that the proposed donor may experience psychological benefit through donation, and the donor and potential recipient have a close family relationship. Where, however, the donor is so mentally defective such that he cannot experience psychological benefit, the best interest standard cannot be satisfied.'-" Exceptions to this rule include when the donation is not necessary to save the potential recipient's life or to prevent the recipient from suffering a severe disability, or where a comparable alternative treatment is available.'''" This approach to the best interest of a child donor differs from the approach described in the previous section on bioethics. Courts are more deferential to parental authority and medical professionalism, whereas ethical analysis takes a more objective approach. As such, it should not be surprising if these different approaches lead to different results.''" Legal commentaries express widely divergent viewpoints on what should be the proper legal approach toward organ donation from minors to siblings. One commentary proposes a statutory prohibition on all such procedures involving legal incompetents (i.e., minors and mentally disabled persons).'''^ Another commentary disavows statutory and judicial intervention, arguing that decisions regarding organ donations by minors are constitutionally protected and, thus, are reserved solely to parental discretion.''''' Other proposals include adoption of a legislative standard for " ' See, e.g regulation of organ donation by minors,'''^ incorporation of a "clear and convincing" evidentiary burden to establish the best interest standard,'''^ and modifications to the best interest or substituted judgment standards, or the criteria to measure them.'"D espite the refinements presented by the above legal commentaries, outside of legislative prohibition or outright approval of organ donations by minors, courts will continue to adjudicate these cases in much the same way they currently do. As such, court decisions lacking firm ethical grounding will continue to generate a great deal of debate.
V. RETURNfNG TO THE CASE OF JENNIFER AND SYDNEY
This section, consisting of three subsections, returns to whether skin harvesting from Sydney should have been done, and how that decision should have been made. The first subsection addresses the substantive issue, namely, whether harvesting was ethically appropriate. This requires re-examination of the medical indications for treatment of bums, as well as ethical principles. In response to the conclusion that Sydney's skin harvesting was ethically suspect, the second subsection reviews the procedures utilized in the decision-making process and suggests additional steps to ensure a fair and complete assessment of ethical treatment options for difficult cases. (2001) ("The fact that only two of the seven reported eases (i.e. appealed cases) diseussed above involved a living donation by a mentally competent minor gives rise to a fair assumption that such donations are usually approvedpossibly 'rubber stamped' by district courts-and, thus, the cases never appealed, [citation omitted] A legislative standard ensures that every living organ or tissue donation by a minor, whether a 'questionable donation' or not is reviewed on its own merits, rather than through case law analysis."). Also, Alabama has a statutory exception for bone marrow donation by minors. ALA. CODE § 22-8-9 (West 2003) ("Any minor who is 14 years old or older, or has graduated from high school, or is married, or having been married is divorced or is pregnant, may give effective consent to the donation of his or her bone marrow for the purposes of bone marrow transplantation. A parent or legal guardian may consent to such bone marrow donation on behalf of any other minor."). Doctrine, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 107, 128 (1992-93) ("Since this standard will be based on a presumption that no compelled procedure is in one's best interests, one can only rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence . . . The proof required will be much more than an amorphous psychological benefit which may inure upon the minor . & HEALTH 213, 244 (1995) ("Such factors might include: the minor's capacity to appreciate the risks and benefits of a bone marrow harvest; the minor's capacity to appreciate the nature of the potential recipient's condition; the minor's relationship to the potential recipient; the minor's wishes regarding the harvest; the parent's wishes regarding the harvest; the availability of a primary caregiver to provide emotional support to the minor donor; the risks and benefits of the procedure to the minor (including psychological risks and benefits) if they can be reasonably estimated."). See also Patricia Huna, Infants As Organ Transplant Donors: Should It Happen?, 6 SUM HTHLAW 24, 26 (1992) ("[S] ix factors emerge which could be used to guide future legislation in this subject area. They are the need for consent of the guardian; a substantial need by the donee and a strong probability of benefit to him or her; an absence of another medically preferable alternative; minimal present and future risks to the donor; strong evidence of psychological benefit to the donor; and an independent physician for the donor."). The last subsection discusses the limitations courts face when asked to resolve ethical controversies. These last two subsections call for a decision that requires outside objective evaluation and ongoing supervision by the court.
"^ See Lynn E. Lebit, Compelled Medical Procedures Involving Minors and Incompetents and Misapplication of the Substituted Judgment
A. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES 1. Was Skin Harvesting Ethically Appropriate?
Bums are fundamentally different from the other medical conditions involving sibling transplantation that have been brought before ethics committees and courts. As a result, the available medical treatment options differ. In Hart, for example, a child was suffering from lack of kidney function.'"" In that instance, the medical indications for treatment were clear, as there were only two options: dialysis treatment for the remainder of the child's life'''* or renal transplantation. In Curran, a twelve-year-old boy suffered a childhood leukemia relapse. Once again, the medical indications for treatment were clear, as the child faced either chemotherapy, which had already failed once, or bone marrow transplantation.''" Although neither option offered a high probability of cure, chemotherapy offered virtually no chance of long-term remission. Thus, bone marrow transplantation offered the only hope of long-term survival, if only in a small percentage of patients.'^"
In contrast to the above medical conditions in which transplantation offers the only hope of survival or technology-independent living, conventional treatment of bums yields two different outcome groups: survivors and non-survivors. Survivors generally return to a state of independent living, albeit with the need for long-term medical treatment and rehabilitation.'^' Therefore, if Jennifer was placed in a survivor group following her bum, she would have survived without the benefit of isografting. If, however, she was placed in a non-survivor group, isografting would be potentially lifesaving. It is important to know, then, the group to which Jennifer belongs. To be sure, bum coverage with isografts would provide Jennifer with additional benefits even if she could survive without them, including improved cosmetic appearance, better quality of graft implantation, and shortened hospitalization. It seems doubtful, however, that these additional benefits alone would afford Sydney sufficient personal respect or benefit to justify her use as a skin donor. To be justified fully, skin harvesting would have to be necessary to save Jennifer's life.'" Determination of whether Jennifer would have survived without skin transplantation requires some insight into and perspective on the nature of her injury, the applicable treatment modalities, and, most importantly, her response to "" Hart, 289 A.2d at 387. ' •"^ Dialysis treatment is not a markedly preferable option, as it burdens the affeeted child and disrupts the entire family. See id. at 388.
"" Curran, 566 N.E.2d at 1321. "" Actually, the twelve-year-old half-brother died five months after bone marrow transplantation was recommended as his only chance of survival. His death preceded the opinion of conventional treatment up until the time of transplantation. Depending on the nature of the medical condition, one or more prognostic variables may be used to predict the likelihood of survival at the time of diagnosis. The type of leukemia at the time of diagnosis, for instance, is an important predictor of outcome in response to chemotherapy and bone marrow transplantation. Similarly, the cause of renal disease is important in predicting the probability of end-stage renal disease and the success of renal transplantation. For bums, the size and degree of bum at the time of injury are major predictive variables. Jennifer's case involved extensive bums and a priori'^^ she was likely to be a non-survivor. The initial prognosis, however, is definitive only when it predicts no chance of survival.'^" In this case, the initial categorization only informs the determination because Jennifer's chance of survival was still unknown. Therefore, further evaluation or modification of prognostic variables became necessary. Probabilistic predictions of survival from medical conditions utilize data generated from medical treatment protocols.
Therefore, knowledge of the underlying protocol is essential when determining the applicability of a particular predictor to a specific condition. Medical advances may favorably alter prognosis and render a particular prognostic statistic-based on older data-inaccurate when newer treatments are applied. When this situation occurs, some estimate of the influence of the new treatment is frequently still possible. Truly accurate survival predictions incorporating the effects of new medical interventions sometimes take years to develop.
Over the past decades, advances in resuscitation, intensive care, mechanical ventilation, monitoring, antimicrobials, vascular access, nutritional support, wound excision, pain control, skin and blood banking, surgical techniques, and rehabilitation have contributed to improvements in child bum survival rates. In the past, most third-degree bums of over 60% of one's body surface area were considered almost uniformly fatal.'^^ With the above advances, mortality has decreased to less than 30%.'^^ Jennifer's surgeon's predictions of survival were distinctly lower than currently reported "best practice."'^D uring the course of hospitalization for a serious illness, a patient's response to medical treatment may serve as a sensitive indicator of his or her future survival. Each hospitalization may be divided into one or more sequential phases of care, and successful passage through each phase is required for survival. In addition, each sequential phase is associated with incremental increases in the probability of survival. This is true because non-survivors from prior phases drop out of the group, thus leaving a higher proportion of survivors.'^* For burns, there are three major phases of care: resuscitation and stabilization, initial closure of the burn wound, and '" See In re Sidney Cowan, No. 180564 at 645 . A priori is "from the cause to the effect; from what goes before." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 88, at 103.
' " See Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108 , 11 10 (Del. 1991 . This case presents a classic misapplication of statistics holding that chemotherapy for a child with Burkitt's lymphoma yielding a 40% two-year survival rate was too burdensome to justify treatment. The court essentially assigned the child to 0% survival from a then undetermined survival group.
" permanent coverage of the burn wound with an initial wound closure.'^' Each burn treatment stage represents a major hurdle to successful treatment. Because of its crucial importance, successful initial wound closure should add the largest increment to survival. One report, which studied the hospital course of survivors and nonsurvivors after initial wound closure in severely bumed children, concluded that the major factors contributing to non-survival during the hospital course were prolonged mechanical ventilation, sepsis, serum creatinine greater than 2.0 mg/dl, and platelet counts less than 20,000/mm\ "'" The overall mortality rate for bums of 80% of body surface area was 19%.'^'
When the isografting procedures began, Jennifer was entering the permanent coverage phase of care, after having negotiated the initial resuscitation and initial wound closure phases without apparent difficulty.
Jennifer did not require prolonged ventilation, had no evidence of sepsis, increased creatinine, or decreased platelets, and every indication pointed to an excellent treatment response to standard conventional bum care.'*^ Further, she was undergoing stages of autografting, and the delivery of sheets of cultured skin epithelial cells for permanent coverage was imminent. When taken cumulatively, the information on Jennifer's treatment-the published objective data using modern bum therapy, the curbside opinion offered on survival from an experienced outside bum surgeon, and Jennifer's clinical coursestrongly suggests that current modem treatment was adequate to save Jennifer's life and that isografting was not medically indicated. Thus, short of some information that Jennifer's condition had changed for the worse, thereby placing her survival in doubt, using Sydney as a skin donor was ethically unjustified.
There could be several reasons for the pessimistic prediction of Jennifer's survival. First, perhaps Jennifer's surgeon was using older hospital data or other experiences that did not reflect current statistical outcome. Second, the surgeon could have believed the prediction was an accurate assessment of Jennifer's outcome under his treatment.'*'' The most likely explanation, however, is that the surgeon's zeal to provide Jennifer with the best possible chance of survival biased his viewpoint on her chances without skin transplantation.'*'* Whatever the reason for the surgeon's prediction, examination of Jennifer's clinical course and condition at the time of isografting did not fit with the poor prognostic prediction.
Was Skin Harvesting in Sydney's Best Interest?
Whether skin harvesting from Sydney satisfies the best interest standard remains a debatable issue. Both the hospital ethics committee and the probate court, like the '*' See Sheridan, supra note 25, at S500 and accompanying text. "" Wolf et al., supra note 155, at 554-65. In fact, at the time of the transplantation some permanent coverage had already been accomplished using autografts to cover Jennifer's anterior surface burns. Also, fortuitously the cultured skin cells arrived earlier than anticipated so the cultured cells and isografts were both used to permanently cover the posterior surface areas. '" Of course, if Jennifer's surgeon knew of better outcomes elsewhere and believed he could not effectively achieve the same result, then the best option would be to transfer Jennifer.
"'' One could argue that the surgeon's opinion should be discounted altogether because he suffers from his own conflict of interest created by his duty to treat Jennifer and the physician's duty to do no harm to Sydney. This is simply another reason to weigh seriously the objective data on burn treatment. physical residua to Sydney as well. Such speculation, however, is likely to transgress cultural norms.
A different approach emphasizes the importance of strong environmental influences that mold the nature of twinship. In her book. Not All Twins Are Alike: Psychological Profiles of Twinship, Barbara Schave Klein suggests that fostering a healthy, positive relationship between twins themselves and society in general is a delicate, difficult, and mistake-prone process."^ Specifically, Schave Klein describes four patterns of twinship: unit identity, interdependent identity, split identity, and individual identity."* Unit identity and interdependent identity patterns prioritize the twin relationship over all others; their acts of prioritizing differ, however.'" For example, twins in a unit identity pattem are socially inseparable, whereas interdependent twins typically live apart, although their daily activities revolve around one another. Split identity pattem is characterized by conflict within the twin relationship during developmental years and by separation and disaffection during later years. Finally, individual identity pattem represents twins who maintain a close relationship-they are frequently best friends-but also develop close attachments outside the twin relationship."^ In this fourth pattern, twins need to be treated as individuals if they are going to function at their optimal state of development."' Of the thirty twin pairs Schave Klein studied, approximately two-thirds exhibited the individual identity pattern.'*" The data suggests that individual differences are relevant in most twin relationships, and only in a minority of less than optimal twin relationships would the "closeness" of the relationship serve as the sole factor in making an important decision, such as whether to serve as a transplant donor. Whereas the evolutionary psychology theory described by Segal would favor a general presumption of altruistic action by a potential minor skin transplant donor, the environmental influences described by Schave Klein suggest the use of caution in proceeding with transplantation. Neither approach, however, holds that the presence of a twin relationship alone generates psychological benefits to a donor after bum injury.
One can perceive the uncertainty the psychologist faced in assessing Sydney's status as a skin donor. Besides consideration of the potential psychological harm from loss of a twin sibling and the accrual of altmistic benefits as a successful donor, he had to consider that potential psychological harm to Sydney following skin donation was a real danger. Even if Sydney's skin grafting transplant was successful, she may have suffered psychological harm. Sydney most obviously would have suffered tremendously had Jennifer died despite Sydney's donation. Further, Sydney may have suffered possible adverse effects as a result of residual scarring. Finally, Sydney could also have suffered serious psychological harm from the long-term impact that successful skin donation would have on the twin relationship itself The psychologist would have viewed normal twin psychological development as a maturational process that begins when both twins are viewed as "one" at birth and during infancy, continues as the twins gradually develop differences over time, and ends with separate individual identities. Under this view. ' Sydney was at risk for substantial long-term harmful effects because ofthe potential inhibition of this process by skin transplantation. The short-term reduction in psychological harm by avoiding bereavement from Jennifer's death could have translated into permanent impairment in Sydney's psychological development. Even if Jennifer was saved, Sydney had significant risks of being harmed both psychologically and physically. Taking all of this into account would have made it difficult for the psychologist to conclude that there would be a net psychological benefit for Sydney to serve as a skin donor and provide evidence to satisfy the best interest standard. Furthermore, these considerations seriously challenge the wholesale substitution of a "close" relationship for true psychological evaluation in this case.
B. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
With the twins' parents suffering from a conflict of interest, the surgeon recommended skin isograft transplantation. Because the hospital was obligated to treat Jennifer, the ethics committee provided the penultimate chance to protect Sydney's interest and discern the appropriateness of using Sydney as a skin donor. Yet, notwithstanding the substantial objective evidence to the contrary, the ethics committee viewed skin isograft transplantation as a valid ethical option. This result may have been the product of its own procedural inadequacies, which prevented full and impartial review ofthe case. Two potential deficiencies, one in the composition ofthe committee and the other in the timing ofthe review, are clearly evident.
Examination of the individual makeup of the hospital ethics committee reveals that its decisions were ripe for inherent bias. All committee members were either employed by the hospital or served as members of its medical staff; community members were notably lacking.'^' Ofthe eleven committee members, four were physicians, one of whom was the hospital's medical director; five had nursing backgrounds, one of whom was vice-president of nursing; one was a lawyer and hospital risk manager; one was a patient advocate; and of the two remaining members, one was the hospital's director of social services and the other was the hospital's director of pastoral care.'^^ Moreover, the committee lacked someone with a strong background in the discipline of bioethics. The committee's composition may serve to accomplish the primary purposes of most ethics committees, such as policy development, staff education, and ethics consultation involving miscommunication among staff, physicians, patients, and families.'^^ This internal structure, however, lacks the requisite knowledge and experience to deal with a serious ethical dilemma in a sophisticated manner.
The lone surgeon participating on the hospital committee presented another source of potential bias in reviewing Jennifer's case. First, this surgeon served in various other politically powerful capacities within the institution. Second, as the only committee member with an in-depth understanding of burn treatment, he was the de facto medical expert for the committee. Third, he was chief of pediatric surgery and surgeon-in-chief of the hospital, thus his opinion necessarily carried great weight with the committee.'*" Finally, this surgeon worked as the direct supervisor to and colleague of Jennifer's surgeon, and director of an academic surgical division at the medical school. Later, he served as the medical informant when Sydney's GAL prepared for the court hearing. Aside from the ethical issues faced by the committee, the surgeon's additional roles created separate and distinct considerations and demands that affected his ability to make an informed decision in Jennifer's case. Moreover, he may have been conflicted regarding the preservation of his interpersonal relationship with Jennifer's surgeon, demonstration of supportive leadership for his faculty, maintenance of divisional harmony, and avoidance of encroachment on the surgeon-patient relationship. These considerations can generate their own subtle pressures and biases during the process of committee deliberation and serve to potentially neutralize or frankly distort committee participation.
Finally, the ethics committee failed to consider Jennifer's entire hospital course leading up to transplantation. The committee's recommendation was rendered almost three weeks before the transplantation surgery, during which time Jennifer was making normal progress with standard treatment.'*' Yet, the committee did not reserve the right to revisit its decision or monitor Jennifer's progress during her subsequent course of treatment. Had the committee monitored Jennifer's progress, it would have discovered that she had made substantial strides and that her chances of recovery were much better than it was initially led to believe. If the committee was able to identify the weaknesses in its processes early in Jennifer's hospital course, it may have been able to take steps to strengthen itself and better identify, organize, and analyze the ethical aspects of the proposed transplant procedures.'^* Some experts recommend that an evaluation independent of the providers of care is essential to ethical review for any innovative treatment.'^' To assure adequate information on medical treatment, objective ethical analysis, and sufficiency of its process, the committee would have needed independent medical and bioethical input.
C. JUDICIAL REVIEW When courts adjudicate sibling organ transplant cases, judicial priorities take precedent over ethical considerations.'*^ As outlined in the previous section, these priorities are reflected in topics such as jurisdiction, due process, controlling judicial doctrine, and decisional law. Once the court attaches jurisdiction, it appoints GALs to satisfy due process requirements and utilizes its own best interest standard under the law.'*' The probate court in Jennifer and Sydney's case closely adhered to this In a strange twist of irony, the court established subject matter jurisdiction via provisions of the Alabama Code, which state that the court may appoint a guardian for an unmarried minor if parental rights have been "suspended by circumstances."'" The court asserted that the parental confiict of interest produced by one child serving as a donor and another as a recipient of a skin transplant created the applicable circumstances under the statute."^ In apparent confiict with the Alabama statute, however, the court proceeded to appoint the parents as coguardians to consent to and, therefore, authorize the very procedures for which they were incompetent to decide. In this situation, it is more appropriate to appoint a non-parent (e.g., GAL) as guardian to consent to the procedures, or, alternatively, for the court to retain jurisdiction and only allow the parents ministerial duties to consent to one harvesting procedure at a time as authorized by the court. In this way, the court could have monitored the effects of the initial harvesting and the need for any future procedures on Sydney, as well as Jennifer's convalescence.
To satisfy due process requirements, the court appointed a GAL for each twin."^ Sydney's GAL separately interviewed Jennifer's surgeon and the previously mentioned surgical director before objecting to the harvesting procedures."'' In his report to the court, the GAL proposed the same criteria for the best interest standard as discussed by the dissent in In re Guardianship of Pescinski.^^^ Noting that Jennifer's death was not imminent and that other treatment was available, the GAL asserted that Sydney did not meet the proposed criteria for donation.''N evertheless, the court found that other evidence, particularly the parents' and treating physician's testimony, outweighed the objection."'
The probate court made no mention of whether the judicially derived and constitutionally protected right of parents to make decisions for their children affected its decision."* In fact, the court's opinion was devoid of any supporting authority. Yet, the fact that the court accorded significant weight to the parents' testimony and ultimately found that the parents had the right to give informed consent for the harvesting procedures suggest that parental rights were a major infiuence in its decision. Additionally, in applying the best interest standard, the court found that the non-specific benefit to Sydney from the "closeness" of her relationship with Jennifer outweighed the risks of the procedures and any long-term effects."' One can only speculate on what the court would have done if objective evidence was presented indicating that Jennifer was highly likely to survive without using Sydney as a donor, and if a forceful moral argument was made against using Sydney as a donor other than to save Jennifer's life. Clearly, legal determination of cases involving difficult bioethical dilemmas requires, in addition to legal precedent, indepth consideration ofthe complex interactions of medical treatment and ethics.^"^V I. POLICY IMPLICATIONS Although this case deserves study in its own right for its unique medical, ethical, and judicial features, it also has broader implications for ethical decisionmaking in the health care arena. The ethical dilemmas exemplified in the twins' case strain the institutional infrastructure designed to deal with them. Like the sudden-onset of a difficult medical condition, such an event occurs infrequently, but requires a timely, effective response to adequately address the ethical challenges. Health care providers and institutional administrators should act proactively to generate a response plan for such events. Once the ethical dilemma presents itself, especially when time is of the essence, it may be too late to achieve a well-reasoned ethical solution, thereby increasing the chance of an unethical result. Even if courts sanction specific medical interventions, lingering concerns about unethical conduct can taint institutional environments long after acute events subside. These concerns are disruptive to overall institutional function and reputation. Ethics committee chairs, health care administrators, lawyers, and judges must ask themselves how they would respond to the case of Jennifer and Sydney. For the hospital described here, it must review the process it would undertake to deal effectively with a similar case in the future. Recommendations include assessing the strengths and weaknesses in the composition of the ethics committee, forming a plan to incorporate independent medical opinion, and creating indications and a mechanism for external ethical consultation. Similarly, courts must more closely examine the ethics committee decision-making process. If all information presented for committee consideration comes from the proponents of the medical intervention in question, the court should suspect inherent bias in support of the medical intervention. In such a situation, request for additional independent expert advice is appropriate. Strengthening the process of review is the only way to achieve an ethical and fair result.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article examined the unique and challenging question of whether a sixyear-old should serve as a skin transplant donor for her severely burned identical twin. In the case involving Jennifer and Sydney, resolution of this question required consideration of the applicable principles of medicine, ethics, and law within the short time available for treatment of Jennifer's bums. Attainment of a wellgrounded ethical result was paramount to sustaining public confidence in child welfare decisions made by parents, health care providers, and courts. Upon recognition of the ethical and legal difficulties inherent in the proposed treatment, the acting physician and the twins' parents sought approval of harvesting Sydney's skin through established means (i.e., ethics committee review and court approval). In the ethics committee's view, skin harvesting represented optimal treatment for Jennifer because it enhanced her chances of survival, reduced her hospitalization time, and improved the cosmetic result. When the issue was presented to the probate court, judicial deference provided support for the position that the parents should decide what was best for Sydney under these circumstances. Although both the hospital ethics committee and probate court approved skin harvesting from Sydney, objective analysis of this case raises doubts about whether the decision to proceed with transplantation was ethically justified. Satisfaction of the ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, and justice was especially problematic. The skin harvesting procedures were approved despite Sydney's minority status, the parents' conflict of interest, and the autonomous objection of Sydney's GAL. Further, the projected psychological benefits used to satisfy the best interest standard were uncorroborated by expert psychological testimony. Finally, objective medical evidence suggested Jennifer was likely to survive without burdening Sydney with skin harvesting.
The need to assess competing interests and weigh the evidence for and against skin transplantation focuses attention on the decision-making process. In the case of Jennifer and Sydney, the procedures utilized by the hospital ethics committee and probate court assumed paramount importance because the validity of the transplant depended on their decision. Examination of these procedures demonstrated several areas where bias in favor of performing the transplant likely was introduced. Potential bias areas included an ethics committee composed entirely of hospital physicians and professional staff, internal confiicts by a key committee member, and the dual role of Jennifer's surgeon, who served as the primary medical consultant for both the ethics committee and the probate court proceedings. Additionally, the ethics committee issued its recommendation two to three weeks prior to transplantation, after which Jennifer's prognosis continued to improve. Finally, the ethics committee and court deliberations were devoid of skilled bioethical input.
Incorporation of additional procedural safeguards can neutralize any potential bias. Specifically, the addition of independent community members would balance ethics committee membership, a process to recuse a member would eliminate conflicts of interest from ethics committee deliberations, an independent medical opinion would enhance the reliability of prognosis and treatment information, and bioethical consultation would articulate the ethical structure for deliberation. Additionally, ongoing monitoring ofthe recipient's hospital course up until the time of the transplant, and reservation of the right to alter its recommendation, would assure the timeliness ofthe ethics committee's recommendation. Adoption of these safeguards may not have altered the ultimate transplant decision, but they would have re-enforced the notion that the process did not simply rubber-stamp the decision to proceed with transplant.
Finally, examination of this case can serve as a useful tool to proactively address the capability of ethics committees and lower courts to deal effectively with difficult ethical questions. When a medical ethical dilemma strikes, the ability to react quickly through a predetermined action plan can ease the burden of reaching a justifiable solution. Assessment of the weaknesses in the process for decisionmaking and a plan to temporarily strengthen them as the situation dictates should allow most hospital ethics committees and courts to decide difficult ethical cases.
